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COMMENTS ON QUINN
Jonathan Malino
In his introduction to a recent volume of essays entitled Faith and Rationality,
N. Wolterstorff writes excitedly about the recent advances in epistemology.
Using what he acknowledges to be overly-dramatic rhetoric, he proclaims the
Enlightenment's evidentialist challenge to religion to have been itself challenged
and, finally, overcome. I It is safe to say that Professor Quinn demurs. I take his
reply to Plantinga to be a denial that evidentialism has in any way been overcome,
along with the further claim that no epistemological excitement would be warranted for the mature theist even if it had. I basically (and I hope properly) agree
with Quinn. In these remarks I shall try to amplify the framework of Quinn's
arguments and pursue some related thoughts. I shall conclude on a different
note, however, raising a general question about the direction of current philosophy
of religion.
Quinn states the major conclusion of the first part of his paper as follows:
"Plantinga's procedure for justifying criteria for proper basicality provides no
better reason for adopting criteria according to which some propositions which
self-evidently entail the existence of God can be properly basic than for adopting
a criterion according to which no such propostions can be properly basic." And
in a looser vein, he comments that Plantinga's game is "a game any number can
play," implying that religious believers of a very different stripe than Christian
theists can just as effectively use this procedure.
I find a certain ambiguity in Quinn's claim and in his arguments for it.
Sometimes he seems to be saying that given Plantinga's procedure, we can
actually construct good arguments for both the proper basicality of the proposition
that God exists and for the classical foundationalist' s criterion of proper basicality,
and that these arguments are of equal strength. Sometimes, though, I feel Quinn
is only advocating the weaker claim that there is no more reason to think Plantinga's procedure will enable us to construct good arguments for the proper
basicality of the proposition that God exists than that it will enable us to support
the classical foundationalist's criterion. On the first interpretation, Quinn's argument for his claim would be that he has actually produced a good argument for
classical foundationalism using Plantinga's procedure, and that it is obvious that
a similarly good one could be constructed for the proper basicality of theism.
On the second interpretation, Quinn's argument would be that we can see how
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arguments for the proper basicality of theism and for classical foundationalism
can get started, given Plantinga's sketch of the first step of a procedure for
selecting criteria, but that beyond that we have no clear idea since we do not
know how the procedure wiIl work.
It seems to me that on the first interpretation, Quinn's claim would be false
and his argument weak. It is not at all obvious to me how Plantinga's procedure
will yield a criterion for proper basicality that will include theism, and the
argument Quinn presents for how the procedure will yield the criterion of classical
foundationalism, though clearly helpful, seems equally clearly to be insufficient.
The reason is not that our intuitions will include cases of properly basic propositions that do not meet the classical foundationalist's criterion-I think Quinn
has dealt with that issue convincingly-but that part of the adequacy conditions
for a criterion of proper basicality must be that the foundation, when constructed
in accordance with the criterion, can support what we take to be built on it. But
foundationalism notoriously has trouble showing this.
Now it may be that contrary to my intent, my observation is exactly the point
Quinn is after; for haven't I criticized classical foundationalism's criterion of
proper basicality by adding a further constraint to Plantinga's procedure? I am
not sure that I have not, but it does not seem out of the question to think that
intuitions about what is properly basic will include claims that certain propostions
or types of propositions are evidentially justified under certain conditions. This
would then subsume at least part of the trouble with foundationalism under
Plantinga's procedure. But in any case, if Quinn'S point is only that Plantinga
needs to beef up his procedure in the direction of an additional constraint regarding
what can be built on the foundation, then it would seem that Planting a could
easily do so without at all worsening his case for the proper basicality of theism
as opposed to classical foundationalism. The reason is that whereas the classical
foundationalist is arguing for a narrow class of properly basic propositions, the
non-classical foundationalist is doing just the opposite.
On the second interpretation, Quinn's position seems to me correct. He has
noted just how sketchy Plantinga's account of his procedure is. It really tells us
little more than how to begin. But surely the hard part of constructing an inductive
generalization, assuming one's data are readily available, comes only when one
actually proposes generalizations and tries to make them fit. This in tum is
difficult only in the presence of constraints on what (or at least how much) data
can and cannot be thrown out as well as constraints on the "ad hocness" of the
generalizations. But Plantinga is totally silent on these constraints.
We must, I think, assume that a full specification of Plantinga's procedure
would include constraints of the above sort. For he is intent to emphasize that
his approach should not be confused with a superficially similar fideistic position.
Equally, I think he would reject assimilating his view to that of those who gain
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confidence in theism through skepticism about natural reason. But neither of
these contrasts is plausible without constraints on constructing inductive generalizations.
If then we assume that a full specification of Plantinga's procedure would
include such constraints, we must conclude that at present we have no serious
argument to show that we can construct a criterion for proper basicality that will
include theism, and thus no more reason to assert that we can construct one than
to assert that we can construct criteria which will include all sorts of wild views.
Indeed we might even suggest that we have some reason to think we cannot
construct a criterion for proper basicality which will include theism. For once
we insist on constraints on the inductive process, it becomes evident that constructing a criterion of proper basicality which will include theism will depend
much less on the fact that theism is part of the initial data set than on there being
strong analogies between theism and the other members of the data set. But the
disanalogies seem far stronger than the analogies. Quinn notes that in contrast
to Plantinga's examples of other properly basic propositions, theism is not
grounded in a mode of sensory experience which is known to be reliable in the
right conditions. And Audi notes that unlike theism, these other properly basic
propositions are such that normally the only plausible explanation of why one
believes them in the relevant circumstances includes their truth. 2 Both of these
apparent disanalogies need careful study to be sure they do not beg the question
against the theist. But they certainly don't give comfort to the defender of the
proper basicality of theism.
Since the objection to Plantinga which we have been exploring sounds much
like the so-called Great Pumpkin objection, it may be worth looking at this latter
objection and at Plantinga's replies to it. Plantinga formulates the objection as
a question: "If we say that belief in God is properly basic, will we not be
committed to holding that just anything, or nearly anything, can properly be
taken as basic [e.g. that the Great Pumpkin returns every Halloween], thus
throwing wide the gates to irrationalism and superstition?"3 Plantinga's reply is
"certainly not." To sustain this reply, Plantinga tries to imagine why one might
think otherwise, criticizing each suggestion in tum. Does it follow from the
rejection of the criteria for proper basicality purveyed by classical foundationalism? No more than the idea that nothing is senseless follows from the
rejection of the verifiability criterion of meaning. Is it that we lack a criterion
for proper basicality to replace the foundationalist' s? How could this be a problem
since the criteria are built upon judgments about what is and what is not properly
basic, and not vice versa? Is it that different people may very well arrive at
different criteria for proper basicality since they may start from different intuitions? But this could only show that the criteria have no polemic use, which is
quite compatible with the view that only one criterion is right, and that those
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whose beliefs are basic according to erroneous criteria are irrational.
In short, the Great Pumpkin objection holds only if the theist also includes
the objectionable propositions in his initial set of properly basic propositions, or
if he adopts a criterion for proper basicality which also applies to these propositions. The former is highly unlikely and avoiding the latter requires only that
the theist be able to distinguish theism from these other propositions in a way
relevant to the criterion.
Now aside from some uncertainty about Plantinga's remark regarding accusations of irrationality when there are conflicting criteria of proper basicality, I
think Plantinga is correct in his reply to the Great Pumpkin objection. What
bearing then does this have on the objection we explored earlier? Little, I think.
For that objection did not imply that one who counted theism as properly basic
was also bound to so view all sorts of other beliefs. Rather it was that there was
no more reason to think that the theist could construct a criterion according to
which his theism could be properly basic than that believers in various other
incompatible views could do the same for theirs. But this objection, even when
clearly distinguished from the Great Pumpkin objection, leaves us with the
conclusion that the only justification presently available for the claim that theism
could be properly basic is the justification afforded by its inclusion in the theist's
initial data set. It follows then that the same justification is available to those
with incompatible beliefs to believe that their beliefs could be properly basic.
Claims of justified proper basicality will thus have no polemical value. Does
this amount to throwing open the gates to irrationality and superstition? Certainly
not in the sense of claiming that the irrational and superstitious beliefs are true.
But apparently so in the sense of claiming that those who hold irrational and
superstitious beliefs to be properly basic are just as justified in doing so as those
who do not are justified in refraining. Of course we are still left to wonder just
how justified this is. And there is always the potent force of defeaters to reintroduce distinctions.
Turning now to Part Two of Quinn's paper, I will restrict myself to two brief
observations. Quinn discusses at some length the defeasibility conditions for
properly basic propositions. Supposing that theism could be properly basic,
Quinn claims that the problem of evil is a potential defeater that is sufficient to
undermine the prime facie proper basicality of theism for most mature adults in
our culture. He suggests interpreting Plantinga's free will defense as an attempt
to defeat this defeater. Plantinga' s recent remarks in "Reason and Belief in God"
certainly confirm this suggestion. But this acknowledgment by Plantinga would
seem to create a problem for what Plantinga calls the high road response to the
inductive problem of evil. That response consists in noting that the probability
of the non-existence of God given the amount and variety of evil in the world
has to be assessed relative to a person's total evidence. Now if God's existence
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could be properly basic for the theist, then it would be part of his total evidence
and would undermine any otherwise high probability for the propostion that God
does not exists. But this argument ignores the role of evil as a potential defeater
for the prima facie proper basicality of God's existence. Given this role, the
theist would be begging the question to appeal to the proper basicality of God's
existence in assessing the inductive import of evil.
My second observation concerns Quinn's principle that the prima facie proper
basicality of a proposition is undermined for me if I have sufficiently substantial
reasons to think that any of its potential defeaters is true. No doubt it is pointless
to expect a very precise measure of "sufficiently substantial reasons." It may
nonetheless be imperative that we be as precise as possible. For an account of
"sufficiently substantial reasons" would seem to be an essential part of any
criterion of proper basicality and might well be the subject of dispute between
the theist and non-theist. Finally, with respect to the issue of defeasibility, I
wonder if Plantinga would not do well to try to develop an analogy between
God's existence and our belief in free will. The proper resiliency of this belief
in the face of reasons for potential defeaters might be more helpful than the case
of basic perceptual judgments.
In concluding, I would like to raise a question about the entire direction of
current philosophy of religion. When Gary Rosenkrantz showed me the brochure
for the conference, I chuckled at the title. He immediately assumed I was commenting on what he admitted was a loose use of the word "logic". Actually, I
was remarking on the narrow use of the word "religious". Now it is true that in
one sense Plantinga's work is radical. For it challenges the deep assumption that
religion must justify itself in terms of the non-religious. In another sense, however, it is extremely conservative; for it is built squarely on the assumption,
which it seems to me deserves to be challenged, that the foundation of religion
(or Western religion) consists in the classical theological claims interpreted in
the metaphysically orthodox manner. To be sure, this assumption has been
challenged at various times in discussions of religious language. But these challenges were most often weak-reflecting an inadequate understanding of the
multifariousness of religious life-and implausible-insisting on the wild view
that the orthodox claims could not be a part of religion. It is time, I think, to
take a serious look at the place of orthodox theism in religious life. This will
require an empirically adequate analysis of what can be included in a substantive
religious commitment. And this in tum will call us to look philosophically at
the idea of being committed to a tradition. Only in so doing, it seems to me,
will we really succeed in probing the relation between religion and rationality.
Guilford College
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